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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the
solicitation of shareholder proxies through statements that are "false
or misleading with respect to any material fact."' Minority share-
holders are permitted to bring a private action to redress violations of
Rule 14a-9.2 In stating a claim under 14a-9, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) a false or misleading proxy statement; (2) the materiality of that
statement; (3) causation between the alleged violation and the injury;
1. See Rule 14a-9, which provides:
a. No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary to correct
any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or
misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
2. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); infra notes 9-14 and accompanying
text.
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and (4) actual injury.3
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,4 courts differed as to whether a minor-
ity shareholder could demonstrate causation between an alleged viola-
tion and injury in situations where a plaintiff challenged a corporate
transaction that did not require a shareholder vote by statute, the arti-
cles of incorporation, or the bylaws. In Virginia Bankshares, the
Supreme Court resolved this issue by concluding that a minority
shareholder cannot demonstrate the requisite causation for relief
under 14a-9.5 The majority did not address, however, whether the
loss of a state law remedy by a minority shareholder who relied on a
false or misleading proxy statement would provide an alternative ave-
nue to show causation under 14a-9.6 Consequently, at least in cases
not involving forfeiture of a state remedy, Virginia Bankshares affords
a remedy only to those shareholders who numerically could have
affected the vote that resulted in the challenged corporate
transaction.7
This Note examines the evolution of the causation doctrine
under Rule 14a-9 and specifically, that portion of Virginia Bankshares
holding that minority shareholders cannot demonstrate causation
between the alleged violation and the injury.' This Note concludes
3. Mark V. Wilson, Note, Reliance and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws
When Minority Shareholders Are Forced Out, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403, 409 (1991).
4. 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
5. Id. at 2764-65; accord Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1991); Louis LOSS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 948 (Supp. 1991). This is the broad holding of
Virginia Bnkshares. The Court did not address whether the loss of a state law remedy would
provide sufficient causation to recover under Rule 14a-9. Virginia Bankshares, II1 S. Ct. at
2766. Two courts found that, under the Virginia Bankshares decision, minority shareholders'
loss of a state remedy provided the causation necessary to recover under the Securities
Exchange Act. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992); Wilson v.
Great Am. Indus., 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992). This issue is discussed in more detail infra
notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
6. 111 S. Ct. at 2766 (1991). The plaintiffs argued that Virginia Statute § 13.1-691(A)(2)
required minority shareholder approval of a transaction to preclude a subsequent minority suit
attacking the merger after its ratification. The Court held that the facts before it did not
require a decision on this issue because "the very terms of the Virginia statute indicate that a
favorable minority vote induced by the solicitation would not suffice to render the merger
invulnerable to later attack .... ." Ill I S. Ct. at 2766. Therefore, the Court left the issue
unanswered. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
7. The argument is that, in instances where the misleading proxy statement induces
shareholders to not seek their state appraisal rights, the harm to the minority shareholder
consists of the loss of the state remedy. Thus, when a misleading proxy statement causes a
minority :;hareholder to forfeit a state remedy, the minority shareholder should be entitled to
redress under federal securities laws. Howing, 972 F.2d at 710; Wilson, 979 F.2d at 931.
8. This Note is restricted to a discussion of the causation doctrine and its significance in
the Virgin~ia Bankshares holding. The first part of the Virginia Bankshares decision held that
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that the Virginia Bankshares decision departs from past trends in the
law, undermines the purpose of § 14(a), and overlooks the importance
of the role of minority shareholders in corporate transactions. Courts
should determine causation between the proxy violation and the
injury on a case-by-case basis in order to afford minority shareholders
the opportunity to state a claim under Rule 14a-9. Alternatively, a
prima facie showing of a 14a-9 violation should create a rebuttable
presumption of causation.
II. PERSPECTIVE
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of a private individ-
ual to bring an action for a violation of Rule 14a-9 in J.L Case Co. v.
Borak.9 In Borak, a shareholder brought an action under Rule 14a-9
against a corporation, alleging that its merger with another corpora-
tion "was effected through the circulation of a false and misleading
proxy statement." 10 The plaintiff sought to have the merger set aside.
The defendants argued that Congress did not intend to provide a pri-
vate right of action under § 14(a). The Supreme Court rejected this
narrow interpretation, holding that an implied private right of action
exists for shareholders for violations of § 14(a), thus permitting the
rescission of transactions achieved in violation of Rule 14a-9. 11
The Court's recognition of a private right of action under § 14(a)
stemmed primarily from the statutory purpose to "prevent manage-
ment or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by
means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation." 2
The legislative history of § 14(a) further revealed an intent by Con-
gress to guarantee "fair corporate suffrage." 3 Based on these legisla-
tive goals, the Court concluded that recognition of an implied private
right of action would promote the policies underlying the Securities
statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs by directors constitute statements of material fact
that can give rise to a violation of Rule 14a-9. See Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2755-61;
see also Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 346 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding, on
remand, that "conscious disregard of whether a represenatation in a proxy statement is true
constitutes a 'knowing' violation of Rule 14a-9 [under the state statute].").
9. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
10. Id. at 427.
11. Id. at 431.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934)). Other noted
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act include: "[t]he protection of investors, fair operation
of corporate suffrage, full disclosure concerning companies issuing securities sold in interstate
commerce, and the maintenance of free, fair, and open markets for listed securities."
Comment, Securities Regulation-Proxy Violations-Limitation Upon the Development of
Private Remedies Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 51 IOWA L. REV.
515, 517 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
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Exchange Act of 1934 and constituted "a necessary part of an effec-
tive scheme of enforcement."'1 4
Borak confirmed the existence of a private right of action under
Rule 14a-9; however, causation between the false or misleading proxy
statement and the injury to the plaintiff remained an obstacle to
recovery for shareholders. In Borak, the Court did not address the
element of causation, relegating it instead to a determination by the
trial court. 5 As a result, lower courts had no guidance in shaping the
contours of the causation requirement and its satisfaction.' 6 Situa-
tions in which minority shareholders challenged transactions under
Rule 14a-9 produced a split of opinion among the district courts and
courts of appeal.
A. The Causation Doctrine as Developed in 14a-9 Cases
Situations in which minority shareholders lack sufficient voting
power to block the transaction-when the majority holds sufficient
shares to render minority votes unnecessary-are the most burden-
some for plaintiffs to demonstrate causation between the alleged viola-
tion and the injury under 14a-9.17 In Laurenzano v. Einbender,"8 the
concept of "transactional function" emerged as the causation require-
ment when a majority shareholder exists.19 A transactional function
required that the false or misleading proxy material had some effect
on the transaction in question.20
Laurenzano involved a challenge by minority shareholders to the
sale of stock and transfer of stores based on alleged proxy violations
under Rule 14a-9. 2I The defendant, who controlled a majority of
shares in a chain of discount retail stores, had sufficient votes to
authorize the transactions without the minority's approval. The
minority shareholders alleged that the proxy statements regarding the
transactions misrepresented the independent appraisal procedures.22
The defendant countered that even if the proxy statements were false
14. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 297 (1964).
15. 377 U.S. at 431.
16. See Comment, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE
L.J. 107, 108-09 (1970).
17. It is easier to trace the connection between the misleading proxy statement and the
injury to the shareholder when the shareholder's vote is essential to effectuate the transaction
because management does not control a majority of the stock. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
18. 2(4 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1 (2d. Cir. 1971).
19. 2 4 F. Supp. at 360-61.
20. Ia. at 360.
21. Id. at 357.
22. Id. at 361.
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and misleading, the plaintiff had shown no violation of 14a-9 since
"authorization of the transactions was not obtained by any deception
or suppression in the proxy statement but by the exercise of [the
defendant's] self-sufficient voting power." 23
The Laurenzano court adopted a liberal approach to the causa-
tion requirement. The court refused to assume "that the solicitation
of proxies was a gratuitous and, therefore, a purposeless and legally
inert act."' 24  The court noted that minority shareholders' dissent
could potentially hinder the consummation of a corporate transaction
by causing the majority to reconsider its position even though the
minority lacks sufficient voting power to block the transaction on its
own:
It may be that an unfavorable vote from the minority stockholders
would have brought about modification or reconsideration of the
transactions.... Although the proxy solicitation was not a neces-
sary or indispensable ingredient in the execution of the transac-
tions, it was calculatedly infused into the matrix of the
transactions; it cannot now be said as a matter of law that the solic-
itation was not an integral part of the transactions and that it was
functionless in the consummation of the transactions.25
Moreover, the court cited impeachment of the validity of a meeting,
efficacy of a meeting, and deprivation of the votes that would have
resulted from truthful disclosure as potential consequences of a fraud-
ulent proxy statement. 26 The court deemed the actual result of a mis-
leading proxy statement on a vote leading to a transaction too
uncertain to permit a conclusion of its insignificance to the transac-
tion. Noting that "it is not legally possible to decide what legal conse-
quences flow from the informational defects," 27 the court refused to
find a lack of causation as a matter of law even though a majority
23. Id. at 360.
24. Id. at 361.
25. Id. at 361-62; accord Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (denying
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under a lob-5 claim until the facts bearing upon the
issue of causation were further discovered). The Globus court, like the Laurenzano court, also
recognized an inhibition factor:
Plaintiff need not establish causation in a strictly mathematical sense ...
Certainly there are benefits in full disclosure beyond the mere assurance that
corporate action will be taken by the vote of an informed majority. If the
majority is required to reveal all the facts, including those which may harm
minority interests, it may decide to forego a vote. In any event, with full
disclosure the minority is in a better position to protect its interests.
Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
26. 264 F. Supp. at 362.
27. Id.
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shareholder controlled enough votes to effectuate the transaction
without minority approval.
Despite the Laurenzano courts holding, subsequent decisions
undermined the relief provided to shareholders by Borak. Unlike
Laurenzano, Barnett v. Anaconda Co.28 limited Borak to those situa-
tions in which the corporate transaction would not have been accom-
plished but for the positive vote of minority shareholders.2 9 In
Barnett, the defendants owned and voted 73% of the corporation's
stock in favor of the challenged transaction. The defendants argued
that, due to their ownership of the requisite voting power to approve
the transaction, the plaintiffs could not have affected the outcome of
the vote. Thus, even if the proxy statement was misleading, the
alleged violation had no relevance to the transaction.30
The Barnett court held that the mere allegation of a Rule 14a-9
violation does not entitle a plaintiff to relief "absent some connection
between the alleged violation and the injury claimed. ' 31  In distin-
guishing Borak, the court stated:
In [orak] the Supreme Court pointed out that it had been alleged
that the merger complained of "would not have been approved but
for the false and misleading statements in the proxy solicitation
material."..... Here there is no question of fact as to causal rela-
tions hip between the proxy material and the transactions under
attack. The "but for" element-the element of causation-does
not and, indeed, could not exist. The transactions under attack did
not result from the issuance of the allegedly misleading proxy
material which, in view of the affirmative and concededly true alle-
gation as to [the defendant's] 73% stock holdings, could not have
had anything to do with the approval and consummation of such
transactions.32
The Barnett court concluded that the transactions would have been
consummated regardless of minority opposition, and thus, the plain-
tiffs failed to satisfy the causation requirement.3 3
28. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
29. Id. at 771.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 770.
32. Id. at 771; accord Adair v. Schneider, 293 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment because the complaint failed to demonstrate
causation tinder Rule lOb-5, since the defendant, who controlled a majority of the shares,
could have unilaterally approved the amendment to the certificate of incorporation leading to
the sale of securities).
33. 235 F. Supp. at 776; see Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In
Hoover, the complaint alleged that the false information in the proxy statement caused the
stockholders to sell their stock, giving the defendants control and enabling them to commit
acts of waste. It further alleged that the proxy statement gave false reasons in favor of an
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B. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard of causa-
tion under Rule 14a-9 in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 34 In Mills,
minority shareholders sought to set aside a merger between their cor-
poration and two other corporations based on the alleged use of a
misleading proxy statement. The proxy statement issued by the board
of directors, which recommended approval of the merger, failed to
inform the shareholders that each of the corporation's directors were
nominees of the two other corporations. Under the terms of the
merger agreement, approval of the transaction required a vote of two-
thirds of the Auto-Lite shares.35 The defendant corporations con-
trolled only 54% of the outstanding shares, thus requiring the
approval of a substantial number of minority shareholders.3 6
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision that
§ 14(a) required a separate showing of causation and of materiality of
the false or misleading proxy statement. 37  Instead, the Court col-
lapsed the causation element into the materiality requirement:
Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has
made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the viola-
tion and the injury for which he seeks redress if ... he proves that
the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction.38
Hence, satisfaction of the standard of materiality automatically estab-
amendment to the company's charter. The court held that these allegations did not state a
cause of action under Rule 14a-9 because there was no allegation of specific corporate action
taken as a result of the misleading proxy statement. Also, the defendant controlled enough
shares to accomplish the challenged charter amendment anyway. It is thus unlikely that the
Hoover court would have found a violation of Rule 14a-9, even if the plaintiff had alleged that
specific corporate action was taken as a result of the misleading proxy statement. Id. at 230-
31; see also Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dismissing an
allegation that shareholders had issued their stock to directors in reliance on false proxy
statements, which had failed to disclose the directors' fraudulent activities, because the
complaint failed to state any damage from the proxy violations); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (dismissing a § 14(a) claim alleging that a by-law
amendment was solicited by unlawful proxy statements, since the defendants controlled
enough shares to pass the amendment without the minority's approval).
34. 396 U.S. 375, 377 (1970).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 378. This fact distinguishes Mills from Virginia Bankshares. In Virginia
Bankshares, the minority's approval was not numerically necessary to authorize the
transaction. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 397.
38. Id. at 385. Mills held that the standard of materiality is satisfied when "the defect was
of such a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder
who was in the process of deciding how to vote." Id. at 384. The Court further clarified this
standard in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 439 (1976), where it held that
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lished causation of injury in cases in which the transaction required
proxy solicitation. 9
In Mills, the Court recognized that situations might arise in
which management controls sufficient shares to approve a transaction
without minority votes, but nevertheless decides to solicit proxies.
Although the facts of Mills did not present the issue, in footnote
seven the Court expressly declined to address the causation require-
ment in contexts where minority shareholder votes are unnecessary to
accomplish the challenged transaction.'
C. The Causation Doctrine After Mills
After the Mills decision, footnote seven became the basis of the
position that the Mills Court, had it been forced to resolve the issue,
would have held that minority shareholders could demonstrate causa-
tion evert when their votes were unnecessary to the transaction. 1 The
language: of the footnote indicated the Court's inclination toward rec-
ognizing a cause of action for minority shareholders whose votes were
not required.4 2 After Mills, several circuit courts applied the causa-
tion requirement to minority shareholders, each finding that, irrespec-
"(a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449.
39. The Court found that if the materiality of the proxy statement is demonstrated, the
plaintiff need not prove causation. The Mills Court observed that application of a materiality
standard "will avoid the impracticalities of determining how many votes were affected, and, by
resolving doubts in favor of those who the statute is designed to protect, will effectuate the
congressional policy of ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an informed choice
when they are consulted on corporate transactions." 396 U.S. at 384 (citations omitted). The
Court also noted that "[t]he provision was intended to promote 'the free exercise of the voting
rights of stockholders' by ensuring that proxies would be solicited with 'explanation to the
stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.' "
Id. at 381 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) and S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934)). Thus, by collapsing the causation requirement into the
materiality standard, the Mills Court hoped to promote the underlying purposes of Rule 14a-9.
40. Id. at 385 n.7.
41. See Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[In Mills] the Supreme
Court ... a;ppears to dignify the proposition that even where a majority stockholder does not
require min3ority votes for merger approval, but does solicit proxies, 'the proxy solicitation
might be sufficiently related to the merger to satisfy the causation requirement.' " (quoting
Mills, 396 U.S. at 385)); see also Loss, supra note 5, at 1119 ("Mills is clear that, once the
plaintiff has shown materiality, he 'has made a sufficient showing of a causal relationship.' "
(quoting Mills, 396 U.S. at 385)); Wilson, supra note 3, at 428 ("The Mills Court hinted that
causation might still be shown even if the minority shareholders did not have sufficient votes to
stop the transaction.").
42. Footnote seven of Mills provides:
We need not decide in this case whether causation could be shown where the
marLagement controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction
without any votes from the minority. Even in that situation, if the management
finds it necessary for legal or practical reasons to solicit proxies from minority
1172
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tive of the necessity of minority votes to the transaction, the
shareholders could establish causation.
In Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc. ,3 the Seventh
Circuit held that a false or misleading proxy statement made pursuant
to a vote on transaction may be in and of itself sufficient to demon-
strate causation between the violation and the injury." Addressing
the precise issue left unanswered in Mills, the Swanson court opined:
Our rationale for finding causation in a control situation would
appear to be that if the majority finds it necessary for legal or prac-
tical reasons to solicit proxies from minority shareholders, it is pos-
sible that a full and accurate proxy statement disclosure could have
enabled minority shareholders to take some action prompting the
controlling shareholders to abandon the merger plan or alter its
terms.45
Confronted with the same issue, the Second Circuit similarly
held that a minority shareholder's complaint had alleged sufficient
causation under Rule 14a-9 to withstand a motion for summary judg-
ment. In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. ,46 the court declined to
adopt the narrow view of causation urged by the defendants. The
court recognized that "minority shareholders may 'have recourse to
measures other than the casting of proxies' to oppose those who have
'the naked strength to consummate a fraudulent transaction.' At least
they are in a better position to protect their interests if they have full
disclosure of the facts."47 In reaching its conclusion, the court
observed that "[t]o require strict causation would 'sanction all man-
ner of fraud and overreaching in the fortuitous circumstance that a
controlling shareholder exists.' "48
The Schlick court rejected a strict interpretation of the causation
requirement because to do so would preclude minority shareholders
as a class from maintaining an action under Rule 14a-9. The court
cited two general policy reasons for allowing minority shareholders to
recover under 14a-9, finding that a strict causation requirement would
shareholders, at least one court has held that the proxy solicitation might be
sufficiently related to the merger to satisfy the causation requirement ....
396 U.S. at 385 n.7 (citation omitted).
43. 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
44. Id. at 518 n.2.
45. Id. The concurrence in Swanson also answered affirmatively the question left open in
Mills and held that "the mere solicitation of votes" could establish causation. Id. at 524
(Sprecher, J., concurring).
46. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
47. 507 F.2d at 382 (quoting Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 967-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1973)).
48. Id. at 383 (quoting Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331
(7th Cir. 1969)).
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be antitheiical to the purposes of the disclosure requirements provided
by the federal securities regulations. First, the court noted that with
full disclosure the market would be informed, which would permit
"well-based decisions about buying, selling and holding" securities. 9
Second, disclosure might lead to "modification or reconsideration of
the terms of the merger by those in control."50 Concluding that pol-
icy reasons require accurate information be given to the minority
shareholder, the court permitted the 14a-9 claim.5
In contrast to Swanson and Schlick, the Ninth Circuit limited
Mills' theory of equating causation with materiality. In Gaines v.
Haughton,52 the court decided that "the equation of causation to
materiality . .. is .. . limited to situations in which shareholder
approval was sought... for a transaction requiring such approval."53
The court adopted a requirement of "transactional causation," which
demanded that "the harm to [the] plaintiff-shareholders ... [result]
from the corporate transactions which were authorized as a result of
the false or misleading proxy statements. 54
In Gaines, the court dismissed the plaintiff's 14a-9 claim that
directors' misconduct was not disclosed in the proxy materials. The
court concluded that the misleading proxy statements caused only the
election of the new directors, not the alleged misconduct that resulted
in the economic loss to the shareholder. Therefore, the misstatements
in the proxy materials did not cause the shareholder any loss for
which he was entitled to relief.55
49. Id. at 384.
50. Id. The court noted, "[w]e cannot assume that even a rapacious controlling
management would necessarily want to hang its dirty linen out on the line and thereby expose
itself to suit or Securities Commission or other action-in terms of reputation and future
takeovers." Id. (footnote omitted).
51. Id. The Eighth Circuit also addressed the issue of causation as applied to minority
shareholde:rs in Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1979). There,
noting tha "[t]he purpose, spirit and intent of the Securities Exchange Act is to compel full
and fair di,,closure," the court held that the ability to consummate a transaction independently
of the votes of the minority does not prevent a plaintiff from maintaining a claim under Rule
14a-9. Id. at 638.
52. 64:5 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
53. 645 F.2d at 775 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 775 n.23 (quoting Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir.
1979)); see also supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 776. This conclusion indicates that the plaintiffs could have attacked the
election process under Rule 14a-9, but that they could not collect damages resulting from the
directors' misconduct. Accord Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 1979)
(dismissing a § 14(a) claim because the injury to the shareholders resulted from illegal foreign
payments, not from the misleading proxy statements that lead to the election of the directors);
In re Tenneco Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 528, 531 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (dismissing a § 14(a) claim
against directors for failure to demonstrate "transaction causation" where the misleading
proxy statement led to the election of the directors who subsequently made illegal payments.
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III. THE CASE OF VIRGINIA BANKSHARES; INC V. SANDBERG
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,56 involved the "freeze-
out ' 5 7 merger of Virginia Bankshares, Inc. ("VBI"), the wholly-
owned subsidiary of First American Bankshares, Inc. ("FABI"), with
First American Bank of Virginia ("the Bank") through VBI's
purchase of 15% of the Bank's minority-owned stock.58 Prior to the
merger, VBI owned 85% of the Bank's shares. Although VBI pos-
sessed sufficient voting power to approve the merger, state law
required the issuance of a proxy statement recommending the merger
and a stockholder's meeting to vote on the merger.59
Pursuant to this requirement, FABI hired an investment advisor
to determine a fair price for the minority-owned shares. The invest-
ment firm recommended $42 a share as a fair price for the minority
stock.6° Based upon this determination, the Bank's board of directors
approved the merger and agreed to recommend acceptance of FABI's
offer to the minority shareholders. The Bank's directors did not
retain an independent investment advisor to provide a second opinion
regarding the fair value of the minority stock, but merely accepted the
proposed price as fair. The Bank issued proxy statements to each
minority shareholder recommending the merger and acceptance of
$42 per share. 61  The solicitation urged approval of the merger
because of the "fair price" offered to the minority shareholders. At
the subsequent shareholders' meeting, 85% of the minority stockhold-
ers voted in favor of the merger. Shortly thereafter, the merger was
consummated.62
Doris Sandberg, a minority shareholder of the Bank, brought a
The court stated that the materiality of the omission "goes only to the election and not to the
making of the payments themselves," and thus the plaintiff suffered no economic loss as a
result of the material omission.).
56. 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
57. In a "freeze-out" merger, "Corporation A, which holds a controlling interest in
Corporation B, uses its control to merge B into itself or into a wholly owned subsidiary."
Wilson, supra note 3, at 403 (quoting Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 3 n.l
(1985)).
58. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, 891 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (4th Cir. 1989).
59. Id. at 1117. The Virginia state statute provides in relevant part:
The board of directors shall recommend the plan of merger or share exchange to
the shareholders unless the board of directors determines that because of conflict
of interests or other special circumstances it should make no recommendation
and communicates the basis for its determination to the shareholders with the
plan.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(B)(1) (Michie 1989).
60. 891 F.2d at 1117.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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class action alleging that the statements in the Bank's proxy solicita-
tion "contained material misrepresentations and omitted important
facts" in violation of 14a-9.63 Sandberg claimed that FABI and VBI
orchestrated the entire merger and "led the minority shareholders to
believe that $42 per share was a reasonable price when in fact the
stock was worth substantially more." 64 Specifically, Sandberg alleged
"that the directors had not believed that the price offered was high or
that the terms of the merger were fair, but had recommended the
merger only because they believed they had no alternative if they
wished to remain on the board. 65
The Fourth Circuit affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff.66 The
court agreed with the jury's finding that the misleading statements
made by the directors regarding the price of the stock were material.67
With regard to causation, the circuit court held that "if the proxy
statement contained material misrepresentations and was an essential
link in the merger, § 14(a) liability may be established. '68
The Supreme Court agreed that the directors' statements about
the price of the stock met the materiality standard of Rule 14a-9.69
The Court, however, reversed the circuit court on the issue of causa-
tion, holding that, notwithstanding the false or misleading nature of
the proxy statements, the plaintiff, as a minority shareholder, could
not demonstrate causation of damages since the minority's votes were
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2756 (1991).
66. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1121 (4th Cir. 1989).
67. Id.
68. Id. The circuit court based its opinion on its approval of the instructions given to the
jury in the district court, which stated:
If you find that there are omissions or misstatements in the proxy statement, and
thai these omissions or misstatements are material, a shareholder such as Ms.
Sandberg has made a sufficient showing of a causal relation between the violation
and the injury for which she seeks redress if she proves that the proxy solicitation
itself rather than the particular defect in the solicitation material was an essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction.
Il1 S. Ct. at 2769 n.426 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The circuit
court, like the Mills Court, equated materiality with causation. See supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text. The defendants objected to this jury instruction "upon the ground that it
decided the question left open in footnote 7 of Mills." Id.; see supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
69. Id. at 2759. Specifically, the Court held that although the directors couched their
statementi; that the price offered was "fair" and "high" in conclusory terms, such statements
were materially misleading under Rule 14a-9. Id. This Note, however, does not address this
part of the Court's holding. For background information on the materiality requirement
under Rule 14a-9, see TSC v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Patrick J. O'Connor, Jr.,
Comment, Disclosure of Regulatory Violations Under the Federal Securities Laws: Establishing
the Limit.- of Materiality, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 225-30 (1981); see also supra note 8.
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not necessary to accomplish the merger.7"
A. Analysis of Reasoning
The plaintiff in Virginia Bankshares sought to expand the scope
of the Court's holding in Mills by advocating its application to her
status as a minority shareholder. 71 Sandberg argued that the defend-
ants would not have consummated the merger without the approval
of the minority.72 Alternatively she argued that the proxy solicitation
was an "essential link" in the execution of the merger since it satisfied
the state statutory requirement of minority shareholder approval
which saved the merger from voidability in the event of a director's
conflict of interest.7 a
In rejecting each of these theories, the Court opined that neither
theory "presents the proxy solicitation as essential in the sense of
Mills' causal sequence, in which the solicitation links a directors' pro-
posal with the votes legally required to authorize the action pro-
posed."' 74 By narrowly interpreting the causation element in Mills to
require a demonstration of a legal requirement that management
obtain minority approval to authorize the transaction, Virginia Bank-
shares substantially limited the Mills decision.73
70. 111 S. Ct. at 2761-65.
71. Recall that the Mills Court held that causation is established if the proxy solicitation
was "an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970); see
supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
72. 111 S. Ct. at 2762.
73. Id. The Virginia statute provides in relevant part:
A conflict of interests transaction is not voidable by the corporation solely
because of the director's interest in the transaction if ... [t]he material facts of
the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed to the shareholders
entitled to vote and they authorized ... the transaction.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A)(2) (Michie 1989).
74. 111 S. Ct. at 2763 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority on
this point:
I do not believe that it constitutes an unwarranted extension of the rationale of
Mills to conclude that because management found it necessary-whether for
"legal or practical reasons"-to solicit proxies from minority shareholders to
obtain their approval of the merger, that solicitation "was an essential link in the
accomplishment of the transaction".
Id. at 2768 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 & n.7 (1970)).
75. The Court's use of Mills, however, is based upon a tenuous conclusion at best. See Ill
S. Ct. at 2770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Mills ... did not
purport to limit the scope of Borak actions ...."). Under the facts presented to the Court in
Mills, the transaction required the minority's approval because there was no controlling
shareholder. The Mills Court did not declare that this was the only set of circumstances that
could establish causation. In fact, the Court expressly declined to address the issue. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text. Therefore, Mills is not authoritative on this point.
Consequently, any conclusion as to how the Mills Court would have resolved the issue is
11771993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1165
The Court invoked the "fundamental principles governing recog-
nition of a right of action implied by a federal statute" 76 in consider-
ing whether to expand the scope of plaintiffs entitled to maintain an
action under § 14(a) to include minority shareholders. Ultimately,
the Court found no congressional intent to recognize a theory of non-
voting causation sufficient to encompass the recognition of claims by
minority shareholders." The Court examined Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,78 which restricted standing to maintain an action
under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193479 to actual
purchasers and sellers of securities. In Blue Chip, the Court had
expressed concern that expanding the availability of the implied right
of action under Rule lOb-5 would create "vexatious litigation, 8 0
because a claim would depend largely upon oral testimony. This, in
turn, "would throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues
speculative and should not be viewed as compelling the decision reached by the Virginia
Banksharev Court.
76. Id. at 2763. The Court noted that the central inquiry in deciding whether to recognize
an implied private right of action is congressional intent. See Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which set forth
the applicable test:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one, several factors are relevant. First .... does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit of implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?...
Thi:rd, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law ... so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
caue of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78.
77. 111 S. Ct. at 2763. A nonvoting causation theory accepts a connection between the
alleged violation and some type of loss other than the vote which authorized the transaction.
Under such a theory, the deceit itself is a loss because it prevents the minority from taking
action to block the transaction. The theory recognizes that the transaction in question might
not have been accomplished without the minority's approval even though the minority could
not have altered the numbers of the vote. Compare Justice Scalia's opinion, which, in rejecting
a cause of action for minority shareholders, stated that Congress never intended to create an
implied ciuse of action under § 14(a) for any private individual. Id. at 2767 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
78. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
79. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
80. 421 U.S. at 742-43.
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of historical fact," ' creating "protracted discovery" and providing
little chance of pre-trial resolution of cases.8 2
Citing the same concerns as the Blue Chip Court, the Virginia
Bankshares Court concluded that an implied private right of action
under Rule 14a-9 could not lie under a nonvoting causation theory. 3
In doing so, the Court rejected the plaintiff's first argument that the
majority shareholders had taken the minority's view into account
when deciding to go forward with the merger. Using language similar
to that in Blue Chip, the Court explained that this theory "would turn
on inferences about what the corporate directors would have thought
and done .... The issues would be hazy, their litigation protracted,
and their resolution unreliable." '8 4
The Court declined to address the plaintiff's second argument
that the need for the minority's approval to protect the merger from
future voidability under state law provided the necessary causation
element.85 Instead, the Court concluded that the facts presented in
the case did not mandate a ruling on the issue "since there [was] no
indication ... that the proxy solicitation resulted in any such loss."' "6
The Court reasoned that the state statute protecting the merger from
voidability in the event of a conflict of interest would not prevail if a
shareholder attacked the validity of the merger on the ground of a
conflict of interest if that shareholder's approval of the transaction
was based on a false or misleading proxy statement.8 7
B. Significance and Criticism of Virginia Bankshares
The Virginia Bankshares Court did not face the issue of causa-
tion in situations in which the proxy violation resulted in the loss of a
plaintiff's state law remedy. 8 Two cases subsequent to Virginia
Bankshares held that such a loss would suffice to permit a federal
action under Rule 14a-9. In Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp.,89 the
81. Id. at 743.
82. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, Il1 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 (1991).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2765. The Second Circuit accepted a nonvoting causation theory in Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). The
Schlick court stated that the theory constituted a less strict view of transaction causation. The
court recognized that minority shareholder approval has value separate from the actual casting
of proxy votes. Since the minority can influence the majority's vote, the minority suffers harm
by being deceived in the first place. 507 F.2d at 382.
85. 111 S. Ct. at 2765-66.
86. Id. at 2766.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2765-66; see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
89. 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992).
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Sixth Circuit interpreted Virginia Bankshares to permit an action by
minority shareholders under Rule 13e-3 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 90 The minority shareholders in Howing, who lacked suf-
ficient voting power to block the transaction, alleged a violation of
Rule 13e-3, which requires a statement to shareholders regarding the
fairness of the "going private" transactions and the basis for that
belief.91 On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of the Virginia Bankshares decision, 92 the Howing court had the
opportunity to address the question left unanswered by that case:
Does the forfeiture of a state law remedy provide the causation neces-
sary for recovery under federal securities law?
The defendant in Howing argued that the court must reject all
nonvoting theories of causation in light of Virginia Bankshares.93 The
court, however, refused to apply such a broad construction. It held
that Virginia Bankshares does permit an action by minority share-
holders under federal securities laws if a violation resulted in the
minority shareholder's forfeiture of a state law remedy.94 Unlike the
plaintiffs in Virginia Bankshares, the minority shareholders in Howing
had the state law right of appraisal. 95 The plaintiffs argued that they
forfeited their appraisal rights as a result of the § 13(e) violation and
that this forfeiture provided the causation necessary for a private
action under § 13(e).96 The court agreed, finding that causation based
on the loss of a state law remedy is consistent with Virginia
Bankshares.97
The Howing court distinguished between Mills and Virginia
Bankshares based on a theory it referred to as "the power to act."98 It
noted that the Mills Court adopted a presumption of causation
because there the minority shareholders had the power to act by vot-
ing since their approval was necessary to accomplish the transac-
tion.99 In Virginia Bankshares, however, the Court rejected a
presumption of causation as too speculative because the power to act
lay with the directors who may or may not have voted down the
transaction because of minority disapproval." ° The court empha-
90. Id. at 706.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1992).
92. 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991).
93. 972 F.2d at 705.
94. Id. at 706.
95. See Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson 1992).
96. 972 F.2d at 707.
97. Id. at 710.
98. Id. at 708.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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sized that the minority shareholders in Howing, who forfeited their
state law appraisal rights as a result of the misleading statement, had
the power to act:
The Plaintiffs' loss-of-state-law-remedy theory relies on a presump-
tion that is no more speculative than the presumption made by the
Court in Mills, and less so than the one rejected by the Court in
Virginia Bankshares. The presumption concerns likely action by
shareholders, and the causal link arises from the enforceable terms
of the corporate relationship. 01
In finding a right of action for minority shareholders based on
the loss of a state law remedy, the Howing court also relied on the
congressional intent to create a private right of action under § 13(e):
"Having found such congressional intent, we would certainly be hesi-
tant to conclude that Congress also intended that causation could not
be demonstrated in any case where the minority shareholders lack
sufficient votes to block the transaction." ' 2 The court allowed the
§ 13(e) action on the ground that these shareholders require the pro-
tection of the securities laws.
Like Howing, Wilson v. Great American Industries, Inc. 103 also
held that the forfeiture of state law appraisal rights by shareholders is
sufficient to establish causation under § 14(a).1° The plaintiffs in
Wilson alleged that the false proxy statements "induced them to
exchange their shares" because the statements "created an unfair
exchange ratio." 10 5
In order to grant relief to the plaintiffs, the Wilson court gave a
narrow reading to Virginia Bankshares:
The Supreme Court in Virginia Bankshares did not hold that
minority shareholders whose votes number too few to affect the
outcome of a shareholder vote may never recover damages under
§ 14(a) or that no implied private cause of action for such share-
holders is provided under that section of the Act. 106
The court held that nonvoting theories of causation would suffice to
demonstrate the injury necessary to maintain a 14a-9 claim. Thus,
whenever a shareholder accepts "an unfair exchange ratio . . . rather
than recoup a greater value through state appraisal," or forfeits
"appraisal rights by voting in favor of the proposed corporate
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 931.
105. Id. at 926.
106. Id. at 929.
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merger,"' the shareholder can establish causation.1 °7
The Wilson court also recognized certain policy reasons for giv-
ing relief to minority shareholders whose votes are not numerically
required for the accomplishment of the transaction:
[Rule 14a-9] does not suggest that the prohibition of material mis-
representations in a proxy extends only to necessary proxies that
are mailed to shareholders the solicitation of whose votes may
affect the outcome of the proposed corporate action. That a con-
trolling group of shareholders may accomplish any corporate
change they want does not insulate them from liability for injury
occasioned when they commit the sort of fraud that the protection
of § 14(a) to plaintiffs, we think, might sanction overreaching by
controlling shareholders when the minority shareholders most
need § 14(a)'s protection.'08
How the Supreme Court would address the causation issue in a
case in which minority shareholders have forfeited a state law remedy
remains unclear. If the Court adopts the Howing "power to act" anal-
ysis, it should allow a private action for minority shareholders who
have forfeited state remedies. Moreover, the power to act theory cou-
pled with the congressional intent of providing protection to share-
holders support a finding of causation even in cases in which there has
been no loss of state law remedy. Although the Howing court attrib-
uted the: power to act to the directors in Virginia Bankshares, the
power to act also lay with the shareholders in the form of concerted
efforts to persuade the majority. The minority shareholders cannot
force management to vote a certain way, but they are much better
equipped to attempt to change the vote when they have the benefit of
full and truthful disclosure.
Determining whether a shareholder would have selected
appraisal within the statutorily prescribed time limit is nearly as spec-
ulative as ascertaining whether a minority could have successfully
campaigned to prevent a challenged transaction. When the congres-
sional intent of providing protection to shareholders is also consid-
ered, it is clear that Virginia Bankshares should have permitted the
private action rather than draw distinctions whereby slight variations
in the degree of speculation bar private 14a-9 claims by minority
shareholders as a matter of law.
Speculation is always necessary to some extent. After the issu-
ance of a misleading statement, the clock cannot be turned back in
order to determine the outcome of the vote if the statement had been
107. Id. at 931 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 931-32 (citations omitted).
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truthful. It is possible, for example, that in Mills the shareholders still
would have approved the transaction if they had full disclosure at the
time of the vote. Similarly, in Howing or Wilson, the shareholders
might not have opted for their appraisal rights even if they had full
disclosure. The law, however, allows recovery in these narrow situa-
tions because Congress enacted the securities laws specifically to pro-
tect shareholders by promoting full disclosure in securities
transactions. Once it is established that Congress relied on private
actions based on securities laws to further this goal, then the Court
should grant all minority shareholders a private right of action upon a
showing of a securities violation.
The Court's failure to recognize nonvoting theories of causation
in Virginia Bankshares prevents minority shareholders from main-
taining claims under Rule 14a-9 as a class, at least in instances in
which they have not forfeited their remedies under state law. 1°
Taken to its logical extreme, the Court's decision forecloses considera-
tion of all claims in which a majority shareholder exists. 110 When a
majority shareholder controls sufficient votes to effectuate a transac-
tion, a board of directors is able to deceive a minority by means of a
misleading proxy statement in order to consummate an inherently
unfair transaction, while in complete disregard of the strictures of
Rule 14a-9. Moreover, the Court's holding fails to account for the
protection that minority shareholders need. Numerically inferior, a
minority depends on full and fair disclosure in order to take all avail-
able measures to prevent an unfair transaction from going forward.III
When a transaction is found to be unfair, "[t]he interest in providing a
remedy to the injured minority shareholders" should be greater."'"12
A corporate board typically acts with a motive. Thus, if manage-
ment solicits proxies, it is reasonable to conclude that it did so for a
reason it deemed significant, rather than concluding that the solicita-
tion was gratuitous and the minority approval was of no consequence
109. The ensuing analysis will proceed on the assumption that the Supreme Court might
reject a Howing and Wilson loss-of-state-law-remedy theory of causation.
110. See Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1991). In Scattergood, the
Third Circuit interpreted Virginia Bankshares as a complete bar to nonvoting theories of
causation. The plaintiffs alleged that, although the defendants controlled enough shares to
effectuate the merger without their approval, the defendants did not want to exercise that
power unless they could depress the price of certain stock by a misleading proxy statement.
The court found this argument indistinguishable from Virginia Bankshares and dismissed the
claim that the defendants had obtained approval for the freeze-out merger by issuing a proxy
statement containing misrepresentations. Id. at 625.
11. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2771 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. Id. at 2768 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to the transaction. Furthermore, if the presence of a majority share-
holder exempts the transaction from the scope of Rule 14a-9, the
potential for abuse by management of the disclosure requirements
increases. Management's knowledge of this loophole would provide
the incentive and opportunity to use the minority's approval, obtained
through the use of a fraudulent proxy statement, to the majority's
advantage in order to consummate a transaction. 1 3 The result of a
bar to actions by minority shareholders is to allow a board to circum-
vent disclosure obligations that might reveal management's improper
conduct or breach of fiduciary duty. In such situations, voluntary
proxy solicitation may serve merely to placate the minority, giving the
transaction the appearance of legitimacy, while stripping the minority
of any mechanisms it might have employed to block the transaction.
In light of the probability that some motive underlies management's
voluntary solicitation of proxies, application of Rule 14a-9's disclo-
sure requirements to all proxy solicitations provides a sound legal
rule.'" 4 As a matter of policy, despite the potential increase in
demand of judicial resources, the protection of minority shareholders
from inherently unfair corporate transactions outweighs concerns
about prolonged discovery." 5
The Virginia Bankshares Court looked beyond the immediate
facts of the case and considered the general effect of recognizing non-
voting theories of causation in securities law. The Court stated:
"[The plaintiff's] burden to justify recognition of causation beyond
the scope of Mills must be addressed not by emphasizing the instant
case but by confronting the risk inherent in the cases that could be
expected to be characteristic if the [nonvoting] causal theor[ies] were
adopted.""' 6 The Court's ultimate resolution of the issue indicates
that its perceived prospect of overwhelming litigation mandated the
exclusion of this class of plaintiffs." 7
The Court's sweeping rejection of minority shareholder claims
not involving forfeiture of state law remedies discounts minority
shareholders' influence in many corporate transactions. In Virginia
Bankshares, evidence supported the conclusion that the majority did
113. Brief for Sec. and Exch. Comm'n & Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. at 22, Virginia
Bankshares. Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991) (No. 89-1448) [hereinafter Brief for SEC]
(observing that precluding minority shareholders from ever demonstrating causation gives
management "carte blanche ... to abuse the proxy process and deceive voting minorities").
114. See 111 S. Ct. at 2768 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
116. 111 S. Ct. at 2765 n.12.
117. Id. at 2765.
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rely on the minority's approval in ratifying the transaction.1"8 The
plaintiffs substantiated their basis for causation by demonstrating
management's concern that the merger not result in loss of support
from the community and that the minority approve the transaction., 19
Moreover, testimony of directors of the Bank revealed that "they
would not have voted to approve the transaction if the price had been
demonstrated unfair to the minority." 2 ' Thus, the management
clearly "would not [have compelled] the merger unless it was
approved by the minority shareholders." 21
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The evidence put forth in Virginia Bankshares demonstrates the
significant role a minority often plays in the consummation of a cor-
porate transaction. The Court rejected an intermediate position that
would permit a plaintiff in certain instances to establish causation. A
more sensible approach would have been to allow minority sharehold-
ers the opportunity to demonstrate causation because, in some situa-
tions circumstances, a corporate transaction might not go forward
unless approved by the minority.
One commentator has observed that, despite its inability to affect
the outcome of a vote numerically, a minority nevertheless plays a
meaningful role in a corporate transaction:
Even when it has control, management may, for legal or practical
reasons, solicit proxies. [A]s a strategic matter, management may
wish to solicit proxies to give shareholders a sense of participation
and thereby forestall litigation over projected corporate action. It
may also wish to prevent the exercise of appraisal rights . . .by
securing shareholder approval in order to retain sufficient cash to
make the merger desirable to the other corporation. 122
Admittedly, disapproval of a corporate transaction is not certain,
118. Id. at 2771-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. See id. at 2771; Brief for Respondent at 93-94, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991) (No. 89-1448) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
120. 111 S. Ct. at 2772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
management aborted a similar merger the year before upon learning that the price offered for
shares was inadequate, despite the majority's ability to carry out the transaction without
minority votes).
121. Brief for Respondent at 44 (emphasis added). It was conceded at trial that the
management sought a "'friendly transaction,' which required a price viewed as 'so high that
any reasonable shareholder will accept it.'" Id.
122. Comment, supra note 16, at 114 (footnote omitted). Note that in Howing Co. v.
Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992), discussed supra notes 89-102 and
accompanying text, and in Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992),
discussed supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text, the forfeiture of the state law remedy of
appraisal rights has been recognized as sufficient to establish causation.
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even if f4ull disclosure is given. However, proxy violations impair a
minority's role of influencing the vote. A false or misleading proxy
statement strips minority shareholders of any means they might have
used to publicly oppose the transaction by exposing its negative
aspects.123 The deception might also prevent shareholders from seek-
ing available state legal remedies, such as appraisal rights or injunc-
tive relief. 124
Granting minority shareholders the opportunity to prove causa-
tion is consistent with the policies underlying Rule 14a-9121 and pre-
serves the integrity of the public corporate structure. Justice
Kennedy noted in Virginia Bankshares that "[t]hose who lack the
strength to vote down a proposal have all the more need of disclo-
sure." 26 A system permitting minority shareholders to state a claim
under Rule 14a-9 not only would promote the goal of fair corporate
suffrage advanced by federal securities laws, but also would protect
minority shareholders by accounting for politics in the corporate
arena.
Two alternative solutions further these purposes by allowing
minority shareholders to state a claim under 14a-9. First, courts
could determine causation on a case-by-case basis, placing the burden
of demonstrating the significance of the minority's approval on the
plaintiff. Alternatively, upon a prima facie showing by a plaintiff of a
violation of Rule 14a-9, a rebuttable presumption of causation could
arise. Each of these proposals effectively allows minority sharehold-
ers to state a claim under Rule 14a-9, even in situations not involving
the loss of a state law remedy.
A. Case-by-Case Inquiry into Causation
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for four Justices,
espoused a more practical view of boardroom decisions involving cor-
porate transactions. Recognizing the reality of corporate politics, he
stated:
The voting process involves not only casting ballots but also the
formulation and withdrawal of proposals, the minority's right to
block a vote through court action or the threat of adverse conse-
quences, or the negotiation of an increase in price .... These prac-
ticalities can result in causation sufficient to support recovery. 27
123. Comment, supra note 16, at 117.
124. Id. at 117-20.
125. See vupra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
126. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2771 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. Id.
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In Virginia Bankshares, "the management had expressed concern
that the transaction.., result in a favorable response from the minor-
ity shareholders. 128 The plaintiffs presented evidence establishing that
the merger would not have taken place without the minority's
approval.129 Precluding minority shareholders from showing causa-
tion denies them relief for injury resulting from an unfair corporate
transaction, which they helped to accomplish. Therefore, the oppor-
tunity to prove causation has particular importance to minority share-
holders in cases in which their votes were of actual consequence to the
challenged transaction.
The majority's holding in Virginia Bankshares reflects the
Court's predisposition that "unresolved questions concerning the
scope of [securities violations actions] are likely to be answered by the
Court in favor of defendants." 130 If management is aware that it can
violate Rule 14a-9 whenever a majority shareholder exists, it could
secure the minority's approval by means of a false or misleading
proxy statement. Such deception of the minority undermines the pur-
pose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and neglects the impor-
tance of full and fair disclosure. Accordingly, allowing minority
shareholders to bring claims under 14a-9 serves to police management
and preserve the integrity of the public securities market.
Barring an entire class of plaintiffs from relief under Rule 14a-9
as a matter of law constitutes a patently unjust solution. Instead of
embracing such an extreme position, the Court should relegate the
determination of the necessary causal link to a jury. If a minority
shareholder is able to demonstrate direct and substantiated proof that
the transaction would not have taken place but for the minority's
approval, the shareholder should be entitled to relief.13 1 For example,
if a minority shareholder can prove considerable concern by the
majority with respect to the minority's approval or an inherent unfair-
ness in the transaction that the minority would have campaigned
against, then sufficient causation might be established. Of course, it
may depend on the weight of the evidence; however, case-by-case
determinations of causation at least preserve the role of the minority
in the accomplishment of corporate transactions.
B. Presumption of Causation
The "essential link" test set forth in Mills provides an alternative
128. Id.
129. See Brief for Respondent at 44-46.
130. 111 S. Ct. at 2770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. See Brief for SEC at 24-25.
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means for allowing minority shareholders to maintain 14a-9
actions.' 32 In his opinion in Virginia Bankshares, Justice Kennedy
advocated the use of a presumption in favor of the plaintiff in a Rule
14a-9 claim. Noting that the Court majority required the plaintiff to
bear a "special burden to demonstrate causation,"1 33 Kennedy pro-
posed the elimination of this burden and the adoption of a presump-
tion that the misleading proxy statement caused the consummation of
the transaction: 34 "[T]he likelihood that causation exists supports
elimination of any requirement that the plaintiff prove the material
misstatement or omission caused the transaction to go forward when
it otherwise would have been halted or voted down."'' 35
In accordance with the general recognition of private rights of
action under § 14(a), Kennedy's presumption serves "as a necessary
part of an effective scheme of enforcement."'' 36 As such, it provides a
minority with protection whenever proxy statements are made. This
presumption also is consistent with the theory that management
would not solicit minority approval if it bore no consequence to the
transaction. Therefore, the mere solicitation of votes by a false proxy
statement should establish a presumption of the causation required
for a Rule 14a-9 claim. Then, a defendant should be provided the
opportunity to rebut the conclusion that the false proxy statement
affected the consummation of the transaction.' 37
A "fraud-on-the-market" theory could provide the basis for this
rebuttable presumption.138 "Fraud-on-the-market" contemplates that
"artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open
market. '1 39 Transactions achieved as a result of misleading informa-
tion regarding a company's management or financial statistics rein-
force the concealment of pertinent information. Moreover, such
transactions are an undesirable outcome which undermine the goal of
132. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
133. Ill S. Ct. at 2770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 2771 (noting that such "[a] presumption will assist courts in managing a
circumstarice in which direct proof is rendered difficult.").
135. Id.
136. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, supra note 14, at 297.
137. See id. at 300 ("To ease the burden on the plaintiff, any request for shareholder
approval should create a presumption that the vote was necessary to the corporate action. The
burden of proof would then be shifted to management to establish that an adverse vote would
have been irrelevant."). Contra Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 824, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
("In order to establish [a 14a-9 claim] the plaintiff must allege such causation and assume the
burden of proving it by a fair preponderance of the evidence.").
138. Cf.' Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (creating a presumption of
reliance in lOb-5 claims in order to promote the congressional purposes of full disclosure and
preservation of the integrity of the market).
139. Id, at 246.
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fair corporate suffrage. These transactions also provide injustice to
stockholders who believe they are receiving truthful statements in the
proxy material they receive.
A rebuttable presumption of causation also helps to solve the
problems of proof faced by a plaintiff attempting to demonstrate cau-
sation. As one commentator has observed:
While proof that the transaction would have turned out differently
... if the solicitation had contained no material misrepresentations
or omissions might be desirable in theory, in practice such a deter-
mination might well be impossible to make with certainty.... [I]t
is sensible to believe that an untainted process, without material
misrepresentations, would result in a substantially fairer transac-
tion, even if minority shareholders could not affect the transaction
with their votes."4°
In light of the problems of proof in addition to the underlying
assumption of motive as a basis for management's action, the solicita-
tion of minority votes should trigger a rebuttable presumption of cau-
sation. The voluntary solicitation of votes itself indicates that the
minority's approval likely constituted an essential link in the transac-
tion. 4 1 Management has access to the facts. It should have the bur-
den of truthful disclosure and shareholders should have the benefit of
the assumption that non-truthful disclosure aided the execution of the
transaction.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the Court's attempt to limit judicial recognition
of private rights of action in Virginia Bankshares, some courts have
allowed private recovery under federal securities laws by narrowly
construing its holding. 42  A complete bar of nonvoting theories of
140. Wilson, supra note 3, at 429 (footnotes omitted).
141. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970), discussed supra notes 34-
40 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(permitting shareholder relief under Rule 14a-8); Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d
700 (6th Cir 1992) (permitting recovery under § 13(e) when a state law remedy has been lost);
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International Paper Co., 801 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (refusing to extend Virginia Bankshares to preclude suit by a minority shareholder under
Rule 14a-8 by distinguishing the statement subject to challenge. In the instant case, the
challenged portion related to a policy proposal for internal corporate governance which was
opposed by the board. In Virginia Bankshares, the board used the challenged proxy
statements to effectuate an economic transaction it supported.); Wilson v. Great Am. Indus.,
Inc., 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992) (allowing recovery under Rule 14a-9 when the state law right
of appraisal has been forfeited). Contra Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d
1545 (10th Cir. 1992) (extending the reasoning in Virginia Bankshares to Rule 10b-5 cases so
as to preclude lOb-5 plaintiffs from recovering due to lack of causation). Other courts have
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causation effectively would promote a system of non-disclosure and
abuse of the proxy rules. Minority shareholders would bear the brunt
of false disclosure through unfair corporate transactions. To deny
minority shareholders relief is an unjust solution, when, had they had
full disclosure, they might have successfully protested the transaction.
Since speculation regarding the effect of non-truthful disclosure is
inevitable in all circumstances, the Court should err on the side of
affording greater protection to the minority by presuming that the
false disclosure enabled the transaction to go forward.
Borak held that "[t]he purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent manage-
ment or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by
means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.", 43
The Mills Court recognized that doubts about causation should be
resolved in favor of the class that Congress intended to protect by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'44 Virginia Bankshares contradicts
these principles and overlooks the contributions of more enlightened
courts: "It is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposi-
tion that Congress intended by its enactment of section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give true vitality to the concept of
corporate democracy." 143 Certainly, an essential aspect of a true
democracy is full and fair disclosure to ensure shareholders' ability to
use whatever means they have to influence the vote.
Modification of the causation requirement to permit minority
shareholders to bring claims for violations of Rule 14a-9 is an
approach which effectuates the policies underlying the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934146 and is harmonious with the Court's holdings
in Borak and Mills. Moreover, the Securities Exchange Act itself
exemplifies the importance traditionally accorded to disclosure. It is
well-recognized "that disclosure could be used to eliminate most of
the social and economic ills associated with the activities of large,
publicly-held corporations."'' 47 Precluding minority shareholders as a
matter of law from demonstrating causation insulates an entire cate-
gory of proxy violations from private redress, potentially leading to
also decided that the holding of Virginia Bankshares applies to § 10(b) claims. See, e.g.,
Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1991); Nobles v. First Carolina
Communications, Inc., 929 F. 2d 141 (4th Cir. 1991).
143. J.I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
144. Mills, 396 U.S. at 385.
145. United Paperworkers, 801 F. Supp. at 1145-46 (quoting Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972)).
146. See Wilson, supra note 3, at 429.
147. Elliott J. Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 575
(1979); see also O'Connor, supra note 69, at 225 (footnote omitted) (noting that "[d]isclosure is
fundamental to the entire structure of the federal securities laws.").
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abuse of the proxy rules by management and to unjust denial of
relief. 4 As a matter of consistency, policy, and justice, minority
shareholders merit access to a private right of action under Rule 14a-
9 even in instances in which they do not forfeit a state law remedy and
their votes are not numerically necessary to the transaction.
SUZANNE R. AMSTER
148. Wilson, supra note 3, at 429 (citing Mills, 396 U.S. at 382); see also C. Steven Bradford,
The Possible Future of Private Rights of Action for Proxy Fraud: The Parallel Between Borak
and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REV. 306, 326 (1991) (suggesting that Virginia Bankshares indicates
that the Court may be moving toward the complete elimination of private rights of action
under Borak); see, e.g., Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1557 (10 Cir.
1992) (holding that, under Virginia Bankshares, Rule lob-5 plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the
causation requirement).
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